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I. INTRODUCTION
“Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when
one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are
protected by the Constitution and possess Constitutional rights.”1
Consider the following scenario in light of the ethical and the legal implications
that would arise:
A cystic fibrosis patient, nearly 18 years old and unmarried, is brought to
the ER in respiratory distress. She’s told the ER nurses and the attending
doctor that she wants a Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) order, but her parents
are refusing to sign it. Meanwhile, the patient goes into respiratory arrest.
What would you do?2
This scenario was printed in a 1993 edition of the nursing magazine, RN, along with
the responses provided from various nursing professionals. In reply, the majority of
nurses expressed that any solution would be problematic based on the ethical and
legal issues involved.3 For instance, a Tennessee home health nurse wrote “I would
have to assist in the code [to resuscitate], even though it would break my heart,”4 and
a Pennsylvania rehab nurse commented “I would like to honor the patient’s wishes,
but I have no legal basis for doing so.”5 The moderator, Amy Haddad, a physician
and widely publicized ethicist, noted that although parents have the legal right to
make medical decisions for their minor children, minors have rights as well.6 Even if
there are ethical reasons for not issuing or implementing a DNR, we must remember
that parents do not always do what is best for their children, and it is possible that
there are other factors that must be taken into consideration.7
As reflected by the scenario, as well as the nurses’ responses, matters involving a
minor’s capacity to make health care decisions are highly debated. Changes in both
the common law and legislation over the years have resulted in minors gaining some
degree of autonomy in making their own medical decisions.8 According to Professor
Angela Holder, “[t]he court and legislatures of this country have not been unmindful
of [these] societal changes, and there is a definite trend toward allowing adolescents
more freedom to make decisions, and to exercise autonomy and self-determination in
1

Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).

2

Amy Haddad, Ethics in Action; Ethics in Medical Emergencies; Acute Care Decisions,
RN, November 1993, at 23.
3

Id.

4

Id.

5

Id.

6

Haddad, supra note 2.

7

Id. (specifically, other factors include abuse and/or neglect situations).

8

See generally Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Decisional Autonomy for Medical Care:
Physician Perceptions and Practice, 8 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 87, 88 (2001) (specifically
discussing the specific exceptions to the legal presumption of incapacity for adolescents to
make medical treatment decisions).
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their relationships with healthcare providers.”9 Even though these decisions
typically involve low-risk medical procedures, as opposed to life-saving or lifesustaining treatment, some states permit minors to make significant medical
decisions, including whether to have an abortion without parental consent or notice.10
Using reasoning similar to the abortion argument, this note will conclude that Ohio’s
DNR Order law should be amended to include an exception for unemancipated
mature minors who wish to initiate a DNR order when their parents refuse to consent
on their behalf.
Part one discusses Ohio's current DNR law, which does not include an exception
for mature minors.11 It explains the medical difference between initiating a valid
DNR order and refusing life-sustaining medical treatment. However, the note solely
focuses on DNR and how it relates to a minor’s right to initiate his or her own DNR
order in light of parental disagreement.
Part two explains the evolution of the minor and healthcare. Specifically, the
progression from the early common law assumption that minors lack the capacity to
consent, to the present, in which minors are permitted to make some medical
treatment decisions without parental consent or knowledge.
Part three examines the development of the mature minor exception, and the
effect it has had on minor’s healthcare rights. This section will also discuss three
cases that have applied a mature minor exception in determining whether a minor
was capable of consenting to some form of medical treatment.12
Part four compares West Virginia and New York’s DNR statutes to Ohio’s
current law, and ultimately determines that Ohio’s law should be amended to permit
mature minor's to initiate a DNR order with or without parental consent.
Part five will focus specifically on Ohio’s abortion statute, which recognizes a
mature minor’s right to have an abortion without parental consent or knowledge.13 It
will include an overview of Ohio's abortion law, and an explanation of the judicial
bypass proceeding for a mature minor who does not wish to notify her parents. The
section will also discuss the mature minor exception as it was applied in the abortion
cases of Bellotti v. Baird,14 Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health,15 In re Jane

9

Angela R. Holder, Minors’ Rights to Consent to Medical Care, 257 JAMA 3400, 3402
(1987), quoted in Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless
Conundrum, 51 Hastings L.J. 1265, 1308 (2000) (discussing the conflict between legal and
social concerns regarding minors and their healthcare rights).
10

See generally Jennifer L. Rosato, The Ultimate Test of Autonomy: Should Minors Have a
Right to Make Decisions Regarding Life Sustaining Treatment?, 49 Rutgers L. Rev. 1 (1996)
(comparing the abortion decision to life-sustaining treatment decisions, which may not be the
same argument, but carries similar weight and is based on the same premise).
11

See generally OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2133.21-2133.26 (Anderson 2002).

12

Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn. 1987), In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill.
1989), and Commonwealth v. Nixon, 761 A.2d 1151 (PA. 2000).
13

See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.85 (Anderson 2002).

14

443 U.S. 622 (1979).

15

497 U.S. 502 (1990).
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Doe 1,16 and In re Jane Doe.17 It will conclude that Ohio law should apply the
mature minor exception to the area of DNR because it already applies in the
significant medical situation of abortion.
All of the above factors lead to the conclusion that Ohio should amend its current
law to include an exception for unemancipated mature minors who wish to initiate
their own DNR orders. Additionally, the exception should provide a method for
resolving disputes when the minor’s wishes and the parent’s wishes are in conflict.
This section will provide a draft for a proposed exception to Ohio's DNR law that
will include a provision for mature minors.
II. DO NOT RESUSCITATE: AN OVERVIEW
"[N]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common
law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own
person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law."18
A. A Do Not Resuscitate Order: What is it and Why is it Issued?
Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) was initially developed to preserve life,
restore health, relieve suffering and limit disability of persons who unexpectedly
went into cardiac arrest.19 More specifically, it is an emergency lifesaving procedure
that is performed when a person's own breathing or heartbeat have stopped.20 CPR is
a combination of rescue breathing, which provides oxygen to the victim's lungs, and
chest compressions, which keep oxygenated blood circulating until an effective
heartbeat and breathing can be restored.21 CPR was not, however, intended to delay
the approaching death of terminally ill patients.22 Despite its intended purpose, CPR
continues to be classified as an “emergency” procedure for which patients’ consent is
presumed unless an order is issued to the contrary.23
Not long after the development of resuscitation techniques in the 1960's, it
became clear that a minimal number of patients who were successfully resuscitated
survived long enough to be discharged from the hospital.24 Because many
resuscitated patients were elderly, terminally ill, or severely and irreversibly
demented, resuscitation only prolonged their suffering or sustained patients in a
16

566 N.E.2d 1181 (Ohio 1990).

17

2002 Ohio 3926, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 3994 (1st Dist. Ohio Ct. App. 2002).

18

Union P.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).

19

George P. Smith, Euphemistic Codes and Tell-Tale Hearts: Humane Assistance in Endof-Life Cases, 10 HEALTH MATRIX 175, 178 (2000).
20

See TABER’S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY, Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation
(2003), available at www.Tabers.com.
21

Id.

22

See Smith, supra note 19, at 178.

23

Id.

24

Id. at 176.
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permanent vegetative state.25 Resuscitation was determined to not always be in the
patient's best interests, and many physicians believed that resuscitating every patient
was in violation of the "ethical principle of non-malfeasance (not doing harm).”26
DNR orders direct hospital staff not to apply CPR if and when cardiac or
respiratory arrest occurs.27
There are two basic responses to patients in
cardiopulmonary arrest: code or no code.28 To “code” a patient means to administer
CPR, while “no code” implies that aggressive treatment will not be given to the
patient in cardiac arrest (typically DNR).29 DNR orders are issued so that the patient
can avoid the negative effects of CPR. Even after receiving CPR, only five to ten
percent of patients survive and are able to function as they once did.30 Some patients
survive but subsequently die before they are released from the hospital.31 If a patient
survives, he or she may suffer from a collapsed lung or a broken rib.32 More serious
side effects of CPR, such as brain damage, may also occur.33 Finally, even if a
patient survives CPR and is not injured, the patient may be left weak and the CPR
has prolonged an already uncomfortable dying process.
Historically, hospitals favored administering CPR in an attempt to maintain life.34
However, in the 1960’s, the doctrine of informed consent became more widely
recognized as it allowed for increased patient autonomy and a decline in unilateral
decision making by physicians.35 This increase in autonomy resulted in the
appearance of DNR orders, as a vehicle for hospitals to address life saving treatment
decisions. These new procedures arose as a result of evolutions in technology and
subsequently created a new wave of ethical dilemmas in healthcare.36 It also opened
the door to a number of legal issues, including the right to die, which has led more
patients to become involved in decisions regarding their medical treatment.37 In
1973, The American Hospital Association adopted the Patients’ Bill of Rights, which
25

Id.

26

Id., quoting Mark H. Ebell, Practical Guidelines for Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders, 50 Am.
Fam. Physician 1293, 1293 (1994).
27

Smith, supra note 21, at 177.

28

Id.

29

Id.

30

Kaiser Permanente, Medical Procedures That May Prolong Life (2003), available at
http://www.kaiserpermanente.org/locations/northwest/members/yourhealth/library/deathmedical.html#top.
31

Id.

32

Id.

33

Id.

34

AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, EFFECTIVE DNR POLICIES: DEVELOPMENT, REVISION,
AND IMPLEMENTATION 1 (1990).
35

Id. at 2.

36

Id.

37

Id.
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allowed patients to be apprised of their diagnosis and treatment options, and allowed
patients to consent or refuse treatment, to the extent that the law would allow.38 By
1986, most hospitals had implemented DNR orders, and in 1987 New York State
became the first state to pass DNR legislation.39
B. Ohio’s Current Do Not Resuscitate Law
Ohio's current DNR law does not allow for anyone under the age of eighteen to
initiate a DNR order. A DNR order is a “directive issued by a physician that
identifies a person and specifies that CPR should not be administered to the person
so identified.”40 CPR is further defined as “cardiopulmonary resuscitation or a
component of cardiopulmonary resuscitation, but it does not include clearing a
person’s airway for a purpose other than as a component of CPR.”41 Under Ohio’s
DNR law, a declarant may issue a declaration ordering the withholding or
withdrawal of CPR.42 A declarant is considered “any adult who has executed a
declaration…”43 An adult is simply defined as “an individual who is eighteen years
of age or older.”44 In order for a physician to withdraw or withhold CPR from a
declarant, the declarant must execute a declaration and receive DNR identification.45
Additionally, many states have added the right to refuse Life Sustaining Medical
Treatment to their current statutes. DNR orders differ from Life Sustaining Medical
Treatment (“LSMT”) in a very specific, yet also very subtle, manner. LSMT is
defined as “any medical procedure, treatment, intervention, or other measure that,
when administered to a qualified patient or other patient, will serve principally to
prolong the process of dying.”46 DNR is limited to situations in which CPR is
withheld or withdrawn from a person, as opposed to LSMT, which can include a
number of procedures used to sustain life functions, such as nutrition or hydration.47
DNR policies are not designed to address issues relating to the withdrawal of
treatment or withholding of any treatment other than CPR. Furthermore, refusing
LSMT may include a DNR order, based on the patient's wishes, but such an

38

Id.

39

ROBERT ZUSSMAN, INTENSIVE CARE 161 (1992).

40

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.21(D) (Anderson 2002).

41

Id. at 2133.21(G).

42

Id. at 2133.21.

43

Id. at 2133.01(E).

44

Id. at 2133.01(A) (currently there is not a provision in Ohio’s law for anyone under the
age of eighteen who wishes to consent to a DNR order).
45

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.23 (Anderson 2002).

46

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.01(Q) (Anderson 2002) (Under Ohio law, in order to
issue a declaration regarding the withdrawal or continuation of LSMT, the declarant must be
an adult of at least eighteen years of age or older. This definition applies to both LSMT, as
well as DNR).
47

See id.
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inclusion is not necessary.48 In analyzing the right of a minor to refuse life-saving
medical treatment, one must look specifically at a DNR order, which does not
interfere with the patient’s medical care in any way other than if the patient goes into
cardiac arrest and requires resuscitation.
III. A LOOK AT THE MINOR AND HEALTHCARE: PAST AND PRESENT
“Remarkably, the legal presumption of decisional incapacity for adolescent
patients rests on scant scientific and social evidence. Developmental research
suggests that adolescents are decisionally capable, at least beyond the level
presently presumed by law.”49
Should parents have the right to insist on life-saving treatment against the wishes
of their child?50 This situation undeniably occurs, however the circumstances are yet
to be tested in court. Currently, Ohio law does not allow a minor to make decisions
regarding most of his or her own medical treatment, let alone refuse treatment. A
minor is defined as “an infant or person who is under the age of legal
competence…[i]n most states, a person is no longer a minor after reaching the age of
18.”51 Traditionally, common law has presumed that minors are incompetent and
therefore not permitted to initiate or consent to any form of medical treatment on
their own.52 The issue that arises from this presumption is whether a minor should
have some degree of autonomy when it comes to making healthcare decisions.
A. A Historical Glance at the Minor’s Healthcare Rights
Autonomy is defined as “the expression of informed preferences or consent to
whatever we do, or is done to us by others.”53 In medical treatment decisions,
autonomy applies to the right of a patient to give or withhold informed consent;
specifically, the right of a patient to either consent to treatment or turn down
unwanted treatment.54 Adults are presumed to be capable of making their own
healthcare choices, as self-determining or self-governing beings.55 Alternatively,
minors are presumed legally incapable, therefore requiring parents to make
healthcare decisions for their children.56

48

See generally OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.03 (Anderson 2002).

49

Hartman, supra note 8, at 89.

50

See N.S. Morton, Pediatric Issues, in ETHICS AND THE LAW IN INTENSIVE CARE 125, 129
(1996).
51

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 997 (6th ed. 1990).

52
See Melinda T. Derish & Kathleen Vanden Heuvel, Mature Minors Should have the
Right to Refuse Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 109, 112 (2000).
53

R.S. Downie, Introduction to Medical Ethics, in ETHICS
CARE 1, 6 (1996).
54

Id.

55

See Hartman, supra note 9, at 1266.

56

Id.

AND THE

LAW

IN INTENSIVE
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Based on the historical presumption that minors are legally incapable, a physician
is required to obtain consent from the patient’s parents or guardians before
administering treatment.57 By requiring parental consent, the law presumes that
parents are acting in the best interests of their children. While this may be the typical
case, in some instances, parents may not be acting in their child’s best interests.58 In
a speech given to the Illinois College of Law, Professor Walter Wadlington inquires
as to whether it is appropriate to presume that parents are acting in the best interests
of their children at a time when the creation of child abuse reporting statutes and
minor consent laws are becoming more widespread.59
In most cases, parents are not acting maliciously, but are unwilling to let go of
their child, even if it would allow the child to end an extremely painful existence.
For instance, a child who has lived with AIDS or cancer may be ready and willing to
accept death, rather than live life in pain. Because some diseases are diagnosed at an
early age, a minor may have the disease long enough to have a heightened awareness
of what it means to live with it.60 The child can be more prepared to face his or her
own death and forego a painful resuscitation, while the parents are unwilling to lose
their child. In these instances, a minor may wish to initiate a DNR order if they are
ever to go into cardiac arrest, directing attending physicians not to resuscitate.
Also, in issues of neglect or abuse, parents who have not been looking out for
their child’s best interests while they are alive cannot be trusted to make the right
choices when their child wants to die. In the case of neglect or abuse, the state has
the right to step in and take custody of the child away from the parents when they are
not acting in the best interests of their children.61 This rationale is known as the
doctrine of parens patriae, allowing the state to assume the role of “ultimate
protector” for all children. Given the state’s interest in preserving the best interests
of the minor, when making the decision whether to allow a child to die, the state’s
interests must be considered in the balance.62 A minor’s interest in autonomy should
be weighed by taking into consideration the risk of harm from the minor’s own poor

57

See generally Ann Eileen Driggs, R.N., The Mature Minor Doctrine: Do Adolescents
Have the Right to Die?, 11 HEALTH MATRIX 687, 689-690 (2001). See also Jessica A.
Penkower, The Potential Right of Chronically Ill Adolescents to Refuse Life-Saving Medical
Treatment - Fatal Misuse of the Mature Minor Doctrine, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 1165, 1174
(1996).
58

Driggs, supra note 57, at 689-690. See also Derish & Vanden Heuvel, supra note 54, at
117. (parents may be neglectful, abusive, selfish, uncaring, or similarly detrimental to their
child’s best interests)
59
Walter Wadlington, Medical Decision Making For and By Children: Tensions Between
Parent, State, and Child, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 311, 332 (1994).
60

See Haddad, supra note 2, at 23.

61

See Driggs, supra note 57, at 689-690. See also Derish & Vanden Heuvel, supra note
52, at 117.
62

See Derish & Vanden Heuvel, supra note 52, at 112-113.
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decisions, the interests of the minor’s parents, and society’s interest in promoting the
well-being of all minors.63
The interest of a child’s life lies in many hands. In one hand is the minor’s
interests in ending the painful treatments he or she has been enduring and refusing to
endure the suffering caused by the administration of CPR.64 On the other hand, is the
interests of the minor’s parents to preserve the life of their child and the interests of
the state to preserve the best interests of every minor.65 For this reason, most states
do not permit minors to make medical decisions without parental consent
notwithstanding a few common law exceptions and recent statutory exemptions.66
Common law exceptions have emerged for emergency situations and emancipated
minors.67 Additionally, some states have enacted statutory exemptions for married
minors, mature minors, venereal disease treatment, alcohol abuse treatment and
abortion.68
B. Exceptions to the Common Law Rule
In the case of an emergency situation, if a minor’s condition requires immediate
attention because it poses imminent danger to the minor’s health, and parental
consent is not available, courts typically hold that parental consent is implied by law.
Anything requiring immediate attention, or that is causing a child to be in pain or to
be fearful, constitutes an emergency.69 The emergency exception arose out of the
notion that the state’s interest in protecting children is diminished when a physician
refuses to render care to a minor for fear of being sued by the minor’s parents.70
The emancipated minor assumes all legal responsibility for himself or herself,
and when making healthcare decisions there is no legal duty for a parent to consent.
A minor may be emancipated from parental care and control because of status, such
as marriage or military service, or a state may provide a statutory procedure for a

63

LEGISLATING MEDICAL ETHICS: A STUDY OF
RESUSCITATE LAW 129 (Robert Baker et al. eds., 1994).

THE

NEW YORK STATE DO-NOT-

64
See generally Derish & Vanden Heuvel, supra note 52, at 117 (responding to arguments
against a mature minor’s right to refuse LSMT, including the state’s parens patriae duty). See
also Penkower, supra note 57, at 1165 (balancing of ethical interests involves adolescent’s
interest in ending treatment and society’s interest in preserving life).
65

Id.

66

See Penkower, supra note 57, at 1176-1177 (discussing the “Early Exceptions to the
Common Law Rule” of a minor’s capacity to consent to medical treatment). See also Driggs,
supra note 57, at 690-691 (discussing three general exceptions to the parental consent
requirement, including: emancipation, emergency, and mature minor. Furthermore, none of
the exceptions are recognized in the refusal of treatment). See also Hartman, supra note 9, at
1309-1310.
67

See generally id.

68

Id.

69

See Penkower, supra note 57, at 1176-1177.

70

Id. at 1177.
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self-supporting minor who wishes to be emancipated.71 Generally, an emancipated
minor’s parents have no legal involvement in the child’s life, including care, custody
and control of their child and the child’s earnings.72 Emancipation may be expressed
or implied.73 If the emancipation is expressed, the parents and minor have
voluntarily agreed to the entire surrender of the minor.74 If the emancipation is
implied, the parents and the minor conduct themselves as if the minor is
emancipated.75 Implied emancipation may be complete, which involves the complete
surrender of care, or it may be partial, which only frees the minor from a part of the
period of minority or a part of the parents’ rights.76 Additionally, if a minor is not
formally emancipated, but is married or, in some instances, has a child, the minor
may be deemed emancipated and therefore permitted to make his or her own medical
decisions.77
Married minors may make decisions regarding their own health care, as well as
the health care of their minor children. In Ohio, minors may marry at sixteen if
female and eighteen if male.78 If a minor is married, emancipated, or in an
emergency situation, consent will not be needed from a parent or guardian for a
physician to perform a medical procedure. However, in the case of an emergency
situation in which a minor requires CPR, a physician is required to resuscitate, even
if it is against the patient’s wishes.
If a minor does not fall within one of the above exceptions, but is deemed
sufficiently mature, the mature minor exception will allow a minor to receive some
medical treatment without parental consent.79 Minors have also been given
additional statutory rights to refuse or receive some medical treatment.80 These
statutory exemptions may or may not require a finding of maturity for the physician
to treat the patient.
Most states currently allow minors to make some medical treatment decisions.
Such treatment decisions include care for venereal diseases, contraception, blood
donation, drug and alcohol abuse treatment, and abortion.81 Generally, the medical
procedures listed, except for abortion, do not require a physician to find that the
minor is mature in order to treat him or her without receiving parental consent.
71
Robert L. Stenger, Exclusive or Concurrent Competence to Make Medical Decisions for
Adolescents in the United States and United Kingdom, 14 J.L. & HEALTH 209, 211 (2000).
72

See Penkower, supra note 57, at 1177.

73

See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 521 (6th ed. 1990).

74

Id.

75

Id.

76

Id.

77

See Penkower, supra note 57, at 1177.

78

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01 (Anderson 2002).

79

See generally Hartman, supra note 9, at 1309-1310.

80

See id.

81

Id.
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These exemptions were created based on the need for minors to be permitted to
confidentially seek some of their own medical treatments; and the determination that
the minor’s interests in having confidential medical treatment outweigh the parent’s
interest in their child’s healthcare.82
C. Ohio’s Statutory Exceptions
Ohio currently has laws that allow minors, without a finding of maturity, to make
their own medical treatment decisions without parental consent. Ohio minors may
receive venereal disease treatment and drug and alcohol abuse treatment, without
parental consent and without the requirement that the physician make a finding of
maturity.83 These exemptions arose from the need to allow minors to seek treatment
without fear of their parent’s disapproval and to protect abuse victims.84
An Ohio minor may give consent for the diagnosis or treatment of any venereal
disease by a licensed physician without additional consent by a parent or guardian.85
These laws arose from the increase in sexually transmitted diseases among minors
and the fear that minors would not seek treatment if they were required to obtain
consent from their parents.86 In this instance, Ohio recognized the need for minors to
be permitted to receive treatment without the knowledge or consent of their parents
or guardians. Furthermore, the attending physician may treat minors without
determining if they are mature enough to consent to the treatment.
Similarly, in Ohio, a minor may give consent to a physician for the diagnosis or
treatment of any condition that is reasonably believable to be caused by the abuse of
drugs, beer, or intoxicating liquor.87 A physician may render medical or surgical
services to a minor giving consent for an alcohol or drug-related condition and will
not be subject to criminal or civil liability.88 In drug and alcohol abuse treatment,
Ohio again recognizes the need for a minor to be permitted to confidentially seek
treatment, without obtaining consent from a parent or guardian. Under these
circumstances the physician may perform surgical services without seeking consent
by the minor’s parents.

82
Alan R. Fleischman, Caring for Gravely Ill Children, PEDIATRICS, October 1994, at 433439 (discussing the “special considerations” that should be given to adolescent patients,
including the request for confidentiality during treatment).
83

See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3709.241 (Anderson 2002). See also OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3719.012 (Anderson 2002).
84

See Hartman, supra note 9, at 1309-1310.

85

See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3709.241 (Anderson 2002).

86

See Penkower, supra note 57, at 1178.

87

See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3719.012 (Anderson 2002).

88

Id.
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IV. THE EVOLUTION OF THE MATURE MINOR EXCEPTION
“For the protection of the individual and the protection of society, the mature
minor doctrine is set into practice.”89
A. The Mature Minor Exception Defined
In response to the obvious necessity for exceptions to the common law parental
consent rule, courts began allowing exceptions permitting minors to make some of
their own medical treatment decisions.90 The mature minor doctrine is an exception
to the premise that minors are generally incompetent.91 It allows a minor who
“exhibits the maturity of an adult to make decisions traditionally reserved for those
who have attained the age of majority.”92 In cases involving a terminally ill minor,
the minor typically exhibits a much higher degree of competence and an increased
ability to make informed medical decisions regarding his or her own treatment.93
This increased decision making ability is a result of the minor experiencing the
illness for some time, understanding the illness and the prognosis, and being
involved in the decision making process.94
The mature minor exception provides that a physician will not be held liable for
battery or malpractice, if the physician treats a consenting minor of sufficient
maturity without the parent's consent.95 Under this doctrine, physicians are not liable
for unconsented touching when the minor has given permission for treatment under
these limited circumstances. They are liable only if they exceed the boundaries.96
Without the mature minor exception, physicians must obtain parental consent prior
to treating a minor, or be subject to an assault and battery or malpractice action.97 In
order for the exception to apply, the physician must first make a determination
regarding the minor's capacity and maturity to make such decisions.98 The physician
is the most capable to determine the minor patient’s maturity, including the patient’s
understanding of the disease, the treatment options, and the suffering that would be
endured.99 Some of the factors to be weighed in determining the maturity of a minor
89

RICHARD HEDGES, CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES, BIOETHICS, HEALTHCARE, AND THE
LAW: A DICTIONARY 144 (1999) (defining mature minor in both the medical and legal
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H. NEIL WIGDER, Minor Refusing Treatment, in STANDARDS OF CARE IN EMERGENCY
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include: the minor’s age; ability; experience; education; training; degree of maturity
or judgment obtained by the minor; conduct and demeanor of the minor; the nature
of the treatment and its risks or probable consequences; and the minor's ability to
appreciate the risks and consequences.100
Based on the special physician-patient relationship, the opinion of the attending
physician as to his patient's competence should be considered in the highest
regard.101 If the physician feels as if his patient is competent and “mature” enough to
consent to the treatment, and the patient does in fact consent, the physician should be
permitted to treat his or her patient as the patient wishes.102 To date, the Supreme
Court has not made a determination as to whether there is a constitutionally based
right for minors to refuse medical treatment. Even though the Supreme Court has
not made a ruling, many states have recognized that minors are competent enough to
make decisions regarding medical treatment.103
B. Cases Involving a Mature Minor’s Right to Initiate or Refuse Medical Treatment
One of the earliest cases to consider this issue is Cardwell v. Bechtol,104 in which
the Supreme Court of Tennessee held a defendant physician not liable for providing
medical care to a seventeen-year-old without parental consent.105 The Court based its
holding on the fact that the patient was sufficiently mature to make a decision
regarding her medical treatment. The defendant physician testified that the patient
appeared to be a mature young woman, and that her demeanor led him to think that
she was of age, therefore no parental consent was sought.106 The Court found that the
plaintiff “had the ability, maturity, experience, education and judgment at her 17
years, 7 months of age to consent knowingly to medical treatment.”107
Another case which addresses a patient's maturity level in connection with her
right to refuse medical treatment is In re E.G.108 In this case, a seventeen-year-old
refused a blood transfusion based on her beliefs as a Jehovah’s Witness.109 The
Illinois Supreme Court held that courts must balance the state’s interest in the
sanctity of life and the state’s parens patriae power to protect those incompetent to
protect themselves, with the minor’s maturity.110 The Court found that if the
100
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evidence is clear and convincing that the minor patient is sufficiently mature to
appreciate the consequences of her actions, and that she is mature enough to exercise
the judgment of an adult, then the mature minor doctrine allows her the common law
right to consent to or refuse medical treatment.111 However, in its opinion, the Court
stated that the parent’s consent was a significant factor in its decision:
If a parent or guardian opposes an unemancipated mature minor’s refusal
to consent to treatment for a life-threatening health problem, this
opposition would weigh heavily against the minor's right to refuse. In this
case, for example, had E.G. refused the transfusions against the wishes of
her mother, then the court would have given serious consideration to her
mother's desires.112
The last case to be discussed regarding the application of the mature minor
exception is Commonwealth v. Nixon.113 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held
that the maturity of an unemancipated minor is not a sufficient affirmative defense.114
As such, the minor patient’s parents were convicted of involuntary manslaughter and
child endangerment, after they refused to seek medical treatment for their
daughter.115 The Court ruled against the mature minor exception defense in this case,
but Justice Cappy, in his concurrence, recognized the need to allow some minors to
consent or refuse medical treatment:116
[i]n the same way, I believe that when it is demonstrated that a minor has
the capacity to understand the nature of his or her condition, appreciate
the consequences of the choices he or she makes, and reach a decision
regarding medical intervention in a responsible fashion, he or she should
have the right to consent to or refuse treatment. I would, therefore, adopt
the mature minor doctrine.117
C. The Medical Perspective
Even though legal opinions seem varied, medical professionals tend to agree that
minor patients, specifically those who have dealt with terminal illnesses, may have
the competence and maturity to make their own decisions. For example, the
American Nurses’ Association’s Code of Ethics states that minors have rights to
“determine what will be done with his or her person…and to accept, refuse, or

111
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terminate treatment.”118 Further, the Code states that nurses must respect these rights
to “the fullest degree permissible under the law.”119
Additionally, the American Academy of Pediatrics’ Committee on Bioethics’
guidelines state that minors possessing “decision-making” capacity should be
informed and permitted to make health care decisions.120 Decision-making capacity
is further defined as the ability to understand and communicate information relevant
to a decision, the ability to reason and deliberate concerning the decision, and the
ability to apply a set of values to a decision that may involve conflicting elements.121
These medical opinions seem to be based primarily on the premise that minors who
have dealt with terminal illness are sufficiently capable to make their own medical
treatment decisions. As stated by the American Academy of Pediatrics, in an article
in Pediatrics,122 adolescents, specifically those with a terminal illness, may have an
increased decision-making capacity.123 If there is a disagreement in the course of
treatment between the patient and parent, the physician, after a careful review of the
patient's mental abilities, should ideally respect the patient's decision.124
The concept of the ‘mature minor,’ which recognizes that some
adolescents possess sufficient autonomy to be allowed to consent to or
refuse care without parental involvement and regardless of parental
objection, is receiving increasing recognition. We believe that this trend,
which supports the involvement and autonomy of the adolescent patient,
is important, and should be expanded to include all capable adolescents.125
V. NEW YORK AND WEST VIRGINIA: RECOGNITION OF A MATURE MINOR’S RIGHTS
IN DO NOT RESUSCITATE LAW
“[I]n some cases, it will be ethically acceptable and appropriate to respect the
choice of a capable, unemancipated minor to withhold or to stop life-saving or lifesustaining treatment, even in the face of parental objections.”126
The idea of a mature minor's capability to consent to his or her own DNR order is
statutorily recognized in both New York and West Virginia.127 Both states extended

118
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their DNR laws to include the rights of the mature minor.128 Ideally, more states may
begin to follow the lead of New York and West Virginia and recognize the
importance of the mature minor exception and the autonomy of the capable minor
patient.
A. West Virginia’s DNR Law
West Virginia currently recognizes that some minors possess the capacity and
maturity to consent to end-of-life treatment decisions. In the issuance of a DNR
order, West Virginia's law provides that a parent may refuse CPR on behalf of his or
her minor child, provided that a second physician who has examined the child
concurs with the opinion of the attending physician.129 Furthermore, a minor,
between the ages of 16 and 18, who is, in the opinion of the attending physician,
sufficiently mature enough to understand the nature and effect of a DNR order, must
be included in the decision to refuse CPR in order for the DNR order to be valid.130
In the event of a conflict between the wishes of the parents or guardians and the
wishes of the mature minor, the wishes of the mature minor shall prevail.131 The law
does not specify that a minor patient’s decision will not prevail if the minor is
seeking the initiation of a DNR order and his or her parents are refusing to consent,
resulting in the assumption that it may be left to judicial interpretation if the situation
arises.
This statutory exception was applied in the West Virginia Supreme Court's
decision in Belcher v. Charleston Area Medical Center.132 In this case, the defendant
physician did not obtain consent from decedent, a seventeen-year-old, before issuing
a DNR order.133 The Court held that there is no “hard and fast” rule providing a
particular age to deem a “mature minor.”134 The Court applied the rule in Cardwell
and held that:135
Whether a minor has the capacity to consent to medical treatment depends
upon the age, ability, experience, education, training, and degree of
maturity or judgment obtained by the minor, as well as upon the conduct
and demeanor of the minor at the time of the incident involved. Moreover,
the totality of the circumstances, the nature of the treatment and its risks

127
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or probable consequences, and the minor's ability to appreciate the risks
and consequences are to be considered.136
In making its decision, the Court found that it was likely that a minor, who has dealt
with a serious illness, was capable of making his or her own medical treatment
decisions.137 “It is difficult to imagine that a young person who is under the age of
majority, yet, who has undergone medical treatment for a permanent or recurring
illness over the course of a long period of time, may not be capable of taking part in
decisions concerning that treatment”138
However, the Court was cautious not to set a definite rule in the application of
the mature minor doctrine. It stated that application of the mature minor rule would
vary from case to case, with the focus being on the maturity level of the minor at
issue, and whether that minor has the capacity to appreciate the nature and risks
involved in the procedure to be performed or the treatment to be withheld.139
Furthermore, the Court noted that where there is a conflict between the patient and
the parents, the physician must make a good faith assessment of the minor's maturity
level.140 After making this assessment, if the physician deems the minor to be
sufficiently mature, the physician is protected from liability for failure to obtain
parental consent.141 In the most difficult of cases where the patient and the parents
do not agree, if the minor is deemed mature, the physician may resolve the conflict
on his or her own.142
B. New York’s DNR Law
While it has not been tested in court as to whether a minor may initiate a DNR
order when the parents refuse to consent, New York State has also implemented a
DNR law that requires the mature minor to refuse CPR before the order can be
validated.143 In the case of conflict between the parents and patient's wishes, there is
a mediation program in place to resolve disputes.144
In New York State, if a DNR order is requested and the minor patient has the
capacity to consent, the physician must obtain the consent of the patient before
issuing the order.145 The attending physician must first determine whether the patient
is capable of making life-ending treatment decisions. In the case of a conflict
between the parent(s) and the patient, the physician may refer the matter to the
136
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dispute mediation system.146 Each hospital is statutorily required to implement a
dispute mediation program for the purposes of remedying disputes involving DNR
orders. Once a dispute is submitted to the dispute mediation board, a DNR order
cannot be issued until the mediation is settled, or if an order has already been issued,
it shall be revoked.147 Parties interested in participating in mediation are also entitled
to judicial review, if they are unhappy with the outcome of the mediation.148
If either party is unhappy with the decision of the mediation board, the patient or
parent may seek a judicial review of the determination.149 Further, a parent may
bypass mediation and seek judicial review if he or she can show by clear and
convincing evidence that the DNR order is not in the minor patient’s best interests.150
If the parent seeks judicial review through these means, the court may issue a
temporary restraining order, enjoining the order not to resuscitate until the
completion of the proceedings.151 Each decision would be made on a case-by-case
basis, with an analysis of the maturity, conceptual ability, and experience in making
important life decisions.152
West Virginia and New York have implemented statutes that recognize the
mature minor DNR decision-making. As time goes on, more states may begin to
follow in their footsteps and implement their own statutory exceptions to DNR law.
However, many states, including Ohio, have already implemented laws permitting
mature minors to make abortion decisions without parental notification or consent.
In doing so, these states are acknowledging the need for minors to be permitted to
make their own decisions regarding medical treatment.
VI. THE MATURE MINOR DOCTRINE AS APPLIED TO THE ABORTION DECISION
“The United States Supreme Court has developed a mature minor doctrine for
abortion decisions that is significantly more deferential to minors than the general
rule governing the medical treatment decisions of minors.”153
Most states require parental consent for a minor who wishes to have an abortion.
However, states that have a parental consent requirement for abortion are required by
the United States Supreme Court to include a judicial bypass clause for the law to be
held constitutional.154 The bypass clause give directives for an unemancipated
minor, after a finding of sufficient maturity, to seek an abortion without parental
consent or notice.155 Judicial bypass clauses recognize that many minors are
146
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competent enough to make decisions regarding invasive procedures such as
abortions.156 They also allow for situations in which a parent or guardian may not be
acting in a minor's best interest.157
A. Ohio’s Abortion Law
Ohio law permits an unmarried minor to seek an abortion without notice to
parent, guardian or custodian.158 The statute specifically allows a pregnant,
unmarried and unemancipated woman, under the age of eighteen, to seek an abortion
without the notification of her parents, if she can prove that she is either sufficiently
mature, or that she is the victim of abuse.159
In order to seek an abortion without parental notification, the complainant must
file a complaint in the juvenile court of her county, bordering counties or counties
where an abortion clinic is located.160 The complaint must allege that the
complainant is sufficiently mature and well enough informed to intelligently decide
whether to have an abortion without the notification of her parents, guardian, or
custodian.161 Alternatively, if she is not sufficiently mature, the complainant must
show that one or both of her parents, her guardian, or her custodian was engaged in a
pattern of physical, sexual, or emotional abuse against her, or that the notification of
her parents, guardian, or custodian otherwise is not in her best interest.162 Once the
petition is brought before the court, the court must find by clear and convincing
evidence that the complainant is sufficiently mature and well informed to decide
intelligently whether to have an abortion.163 Recognizing the minor’s right to bodily
integrity, the judicial bypass procedure was a result of the Supreme Court’s decision
in Bellotti v. Baird.
B. Court Decisions on the Mature Minor's Right to Consent to an Abortion
In Bellotti v. Baird, the Supreme Court weighed a woman’s right to choose to
seek an abortion against the state’s right to encourage an unmarried pregnant minor
to seek consent and advice from her parents.164 A Massachusetts statute required
parental consent for an unmarried minor to obtain an abortion except in an
emergency situation. This statute was declared unconstitutional by the District
Court, and the Supreme Court subsequently affirmed. The Supreme Court held that
in the abortion context it is unconstitutional to require a minor to seek permission of
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her parents or guardians, or to be required to notify her parents or guardians.165
Furthermore, a state’s abortion statute must have a judicial bypass clause to allow a
minor to seek an abortion without notification of her parents.166 In seeking the
abortion, the minor must show the court that she is sufficiently mature and well
enough informed to make the decision on her own.167 If the court does not deem her
sufficiently competent to make the decision independently, she must show that an
abortion would be in her best interests.168 Following the decision in Bellotti, the Ohio
Supreme Court reviewed Ohio's abortion statute, in order to determine whether it
survived constitutional scrutiny.
Ohio v. Akron Ctr. For Reproductive Health examined House Bill 319, and
determined that it was constitutional.169 The Supreme Court held Ohio's statute to be
constitutional because it provides a method for an unmarried, unemancipated
pregnant minor to have an abortion without parental notice, if she follows the
judicial bypass procedure.170 Additionally, the Court found that H.B. 319 met the
following four criteria, as established in Bellotti.171 First, the minor must be
permitted to show that she is sufficiently mature and well enough informed to make
the abortion decision regardless of her parent’s wishes.172 Second, if the minor is not
able to show sufficient maturity, she must be permitted to show that the abortion is in
her best interests.173 Third, there must be anonymity; and four, there must be a
judicial bypass procedure that will ensure the minor an expedited opportunity to
obtain the abortion.174 “We have, however, squarely held that a requirement of preabortion parental notice in all cases involving pregnant minors is unconstitutional.
Although it need not take the form of a judicial bypass, the State must provide an
adequate mechanism for cases in which the minor is mature or notice would not be in
her best interests.”175 Expanding on the judicial bypass requirement, Moyer’s
dissenting opinion in In re Jane Doe 1 urged the adoption of a maturity test
mirroring that in Cardwell, in order to ensure that the minor is sufficiently mature
enough to make the decision regarding an abortion.176
The Supreme Court of Ohio, in In re Jane Doe 1, held that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in finding that the appellant was not sufficiently mature to make
165
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a judgment regarding an abortion.177 Further, the Court held that she was unable to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that her father was engaged in a pattern of
abuse.178 The appellant provided evidence that she was a senior in school,
maintained a 3.0 grade point average, had plans to attend college, was employed, and
was responsible for obtaining her own medical care.179 However, based on the
testimony, the Court did not find sufficient maturity. The Court also refused to adopt
guidelines to assist trial courts in defining “sufficiently mature.” However, Chief
Justice Moyer, in dissent, urged that the court adopt the following factors to guide
trial court’s in finding whether or not a minor is sufficiently mature: age, overall
intelligence, emotional stability, credibility and demeanor as a witness, ability to
accept responsibility, ability to assess the future impact of her present choices, ability
to understand the medical consequences of abortion and apply that understanding to
her decision, and any undue influence by another on the minor's decision. 180
Finally, the Plaintiff in In re Jane Doe, appealed the Hamilton County Juvenile
Court’s denial of her application to have an abortion without parental notification.181
The Court of Appeals found that Jane Doe clearly and convincingly presented
evidence that she was sufficiently mature and well enough informed to decide
intelligently whether to have an abortion without notification of her parents.182 In
making this determination, the Court looked at Jane Doe’s relationship with her
family and her desire to protect it from potential conflict; her academic standing in
her high-school class; her active participation and leadership role in school
extracurricular activities; her acceptance to college as a scholarship student; her
consideration of adoption or foster care as alternatives; and, her introspection related
to the consequences of her decision.183 The court stated that it could not “conceive
of a case stronger than the present one. If permission is not granted in this case, it
will never be. The law must be followed whether or not it fits our personal
preferences. To refuse to grant permission in this case would be to render R.C.
2151.85 meaningless.”184
From the decisions in the above cases, Ohio courts recognize the need for mature
minors to make their own decisions regarding high-risk procedures, such as abortion,
177
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and therefore should permit mature minors to determine whether or not to initiate a
DNR order if they so choose.
VII. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO OHIO’S DO NOT RESUSCITATE LAW
“The best statutory protection for the minor’s right to self-determination would
be to permit certain minors to execute legally enforceable advance health care
directives.”185
“Whether an adolescent should be able to direct that a DNR order be placed in
his medical chart and honored presents a legal dilemma…Not surprisingly, allowing
an adolescent patient to initiate a DNR order merits special consideration.”186 An
analysis of the legal and ethical implications that arise results in the conclusion that
Ohio should amend its DNR statute to include a mature minor exception. This
exception would allow unemancipated minors the right to initiate a DNR order
without parental consent. In doing so, Ohio would recognize the need for minors to
be permitted to exercise some degree of autonomy in making their own medical
decisions. Cases must be taken on an individual basis, and each minor’s decisionmaking capacity and maturity should be assessed before a physician issues a DNR
order. In the worst-case scenario, if one or both parents do not agree with the
minor’s decision, the minor patient’s wishes must be taken into consideration, and
weighed against the parent’s interests in keeping their child alive.187
Ohio currently permits minors, regardless of a finding of maturity, to lawfully
consent to and receive some medical treatments. These decisions typically involve
low to moderately invasive, but highly important, medical procedures, including
treatment for venereal diseases, drug and alcohol abuse treatment, and contraception
decisions.188 More importantly, Ohio currently recognizes a mature minor exception
to the parental consent requirement in abortion cases.189 This exception recognizes
that many minors are competent enough to make important and invasive medical
decisions. Furthermore, other jurisdictions have recognized the mature minor
exception specifically for DNR order decisions.190
The West Virginia Statute requires an unemancipated mature minor be involved
in the decision whether to initiate a DNR order on his or her behalf.191 In the case of
a conflict between a minor patient and the parent(s), the physician may make an
independent determination as to the maturity of the minor.192 New York has also
adopted a statutory exception to its DNR law, which requires a mature minor to
185
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consent to the DNR order before a physician can issue it.193 However, New York has
also created a mediation dispute provision, requiring hospitals to provide dispute
resolution if there is a conflict between the minor patient’s wishes and the parent(s)
wishes.194 If the mediation is not successful, the parties may then seek judicial
review.195
Obviously, courts and legislatures are accepting the responsibility of determining
whether a minor is sufficiently mature to make some of their own medical treatment
decisions. Other jurisdictions recognize the need for mature minors to be involved in
the decision regarding a DNR order, and Ohio currently recognizes the need in
abortion decisions. The question then arises as to why Ohio has not yet recognized
that a necessity exists for permitting a mature minor the right to initiate a DNR order.
An amendment to Ohio’s DNR law will include unmarried, unemancipated
minors, without an age restriction. Prior to the age of legal majority, no precise age
or maturity level can be designated at which all minors should be permitted to make
their own health care decisions. Restricting a minor’s ability to initiate a DNR order
based on age could possibly permit minors who are of age, but not yet sufficiently
mature, to initiate a DNR order, while prohibiting minors who are not yet of age, but
sufficiently mature, from initiating a DNR order.
A determination of maturity would be made by the attending physician’s
independent review.196 In order to make this determination, the physician must first
discuss with the patient the meaning of issuing a DNR order and in what situations it
would be applied.197 The physician must also discuss the patient’s illness in great
detail, and the treatment options that would be available.198 Further, the physician
would need to explain to the patient what his or her chances of surviving cardiac
arrest, should it occur, and the quality of life the patient could expect following
cardiac arrest and successful resuscitation.199 Finally, the physician must discuss the
patient’s possibilities for a cure, even if they are minimal.200 Once the physician and
patient have discussed all alternatives and treatment options, if the physician deems
the minor to be mature, the physician should be permitted to initiate a DNR order for
the minor patient. If the parent and the patient are in agreement, a valid DNR order
will be added to the patient’s file for reference if the patient is ever in cardiac arrest.
If a situation arises in which the parent and patient do not concur, the physician
will be responsible for referring the dispute to an approved mediation program in a
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timely manner, in which a determination will be made as to the minor's maturity.201
The form and guidelines of the mediation program will also be statutorily set, but
will be left to each hospital to implement.202 The mediation program will be
available in order to lessen the burden on the court systems, and to avoid lawsuits
against the hospital, should disputes arise.
In order for the patient or parent to petition the court, the parties must first
attempt to mediate the dispute using the hospital’s mediation procedure.203 If
mediation is not effective, either party may seek a judicial bypass through the court
system, allowing a judge to determine whether the DNR order should be validated.204
In making a decision, the Court will look at the totality of the circumstances, and
make a determination based on the minor's age, ability, experience, education,
training, degree of maturity or judgment obtained by the minor, conduct and
demeanor of the minor at the time of the incident involved, the nature of the
treatment and its risks or probable consequences, and the minor’s ability to
appreciate the risks and consequences.205 Once the court determines whether the
minor is sufficiently mature, the court will issue an order directing the hospital to
either validate or invalidate the DNR order, regardless of whether there is parental
consent. If the judge does not find the minor to be sufficiently mature to initiate an
order, and the parents refuse to consent, the DNR order will be held invalid. This
statute will allow minor patients the autonomy they deserve, as well as protect
physicians from liability in the event a parent consents, but the minor patient not.
Based on West Virginia, New York, and Ohio’s current DNR laws, the
framework for the amended statute would be as follows:
§ 2133.27 DECISION MAKING ON BEHALF OF A MINOR PATIENT;
A MINOR DEEMED SUFFICIENTLY MATURE TO INITIATE A DNR ORDER;
MEDIATION AND JUDICIAL BYPASS PROCEEDINGS
1.

2.

3.

A parent or legal guardian may consent to a do-not-resuscitate order on
behalf of his or her minor child, provided that the attending physician
makes a determination as to the medical condition of the minor, and a
second physician concurs with the diagnosis.
If a minor patient is deemed sufficiently mature and capable of
understanding the nature and effect of a do not resuscitate order, and the
minor patient wishes to initiate a DNR order, the minor may be
permitted to initiate the order on his or her own behalf.
In the event of a conflict between the wishes of the parents or legal
guardian and the wishes of the minor patient, the attending physician
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will be required to refer the matter to the hospital’s dispute mediation
program for a determination as to the minor patient’s maturity.
Upon resolution of the mediation, the mediation board shall issue a
legally binding decision, instructing the hospital to either issue a valid
do not resuscitate order or to revoke the do not resuscitate order.
If the dispute can not be resolved through mediation, either party may
seek a timely judicial bypass proceeding, in which a judicial officer will
review the facts, the recommendation of the mediation board, and the
maturity of the minor patient, and make a determination as to whether a
do not resuscitate order will be validated or revoked.
VIII. CONCLUSION

“It is not too much to ask for a multi-faceted response from courts, Congress,
and state legislatures to a newly recognized ethical dilemma in medicine. Nor is it
unrealistic.”206
Unless we can differentiate degrees of dignity that should be accorded to adults
and minors, DNR orders may allow minor patients a viable means for respecting
their personal wishes.207 DNR orders should be available to all competent and
capable patients, whether they are adults or minors.208 This idea is based on the fact
that terminally ill minors are capable of making mature decisions involving their
medical treatment, including initiating DNR orders. Commentators Robert Weir and
Charles Peters best state this notion:
[Minors] have had, at the very least, multiple opportunities to think about
the inescapable suffering that characterizes their lives, the features of life
that make it worth continuing, the benefits and burdens that accompany
medical treatment, and the prospect of death. At least some of these
adolescents want to give voice to their values, provide directions for
parents, physicians, and nurses regarding end-of-life care, and be assured
that their wishes and preferences will be respected and carried out should
their medical conditions deteriorate to the point that they will no longer be
able to communicate their deeply felt views.209
The mature minor exception evolved as it became more evident that minors have
healthcare rights, just as any adult does. The common law presumption that minors
are incapable of making their own decisions regarding medical treatment is slowly
fading, and exceptions to this rule have been emerging. Even though the medical
and legal worlds have not yet made a steadfast rule regarding minors and medical
treatment decisions, minors are gaining more rights with time. In the future, more
courts and legislatures will recognize the need for minors to be legally recognized as
206
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competent enough to make decisions regarding their own personal medical
treatment. This need to be recognized should also be extended to include a right to
initiate a DNR order if the minor is deemed significantly mature.
Combining the material discussed and referring back to the ethical scenario
discussed in the introduction results in one question: what should be done? To
recall, the scenario involved a seventeen-year-old, cystic fibrosis patient who wished
to initiate a DNR order but her parents were refusing to consent on her behalf.
Perhaps more information should be included, in order to make an informed
decision. Assuming there was an attached medical definition of cystic fibrosis,
which stated that cystic fibrosis is a disease with a poor prognosis.210 The disease
attacks the endocrine glands of infants, children, adolescents and young adults,
resulting in pancreatic insufficiency, chronic pulmonary disease, and in some cases,
cirrhosis of the liver.211 Knowing that this patient has suffered her entire life with
this disease, and that she is aware of the medical treatment options available, all of
which are extremely painful and none of which offer a guaranteed cure. Furthermore,
the patient understands the risks involved in resuscitation and the pain that is
involved. Should she now be permitted to initiate a DNR order? What if the patient
is an honor student, involved in school leadership activities, and planned on
attending college on a full academic scholarship? Would she be deemed sufficiently
mature and then be permitted to initiate a DNR order on her own behalf?
Under the proposed exception to Ohio’s current DNR law, all of these factors
would be examined in order to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether a minor
is sufficiently mature to make his or her own decision regarding a DNR order.
Looking at the original facts, it is apparent that more information would be needed to
make an informed decision. However, unless the law in Ohio is amended to allow
this young woman autonomy in making her decision, she may be forced to suffer for
as long as she remains alive, or until her parents determine for her what is in her best
interests.
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